When Formalization Costs More Than It Pays: Threshold Accrual and the Actuarial Price of Extending Pension Coverage in Morocco
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66130/0gw25q61Keywords:
pension coverage extension; informal employment; accrual design; pay-as-you-go sustainability; contribution density; MoroccoAbstract
Bringing informal wage earners into contributory pension schemes is commonly expected both to protect workers and to consolidate pay-as-you-go finances. This article examines the second expectation for the long-term branch of Morocco’s National Social Security Fund (CNSS). The branch pays 50% of the reference wage after 3,240 declared days and, since Law 02-24 of 2025, a proportional pension from 1,320 days. We derive the return implied by the legal accrual formula and simulate formalization scenarios with a deterministic cohort actuarial model (base year 2024, horizon 2070) calibrated on the branch’s 2020–2024 accounts. A dirham of wage-indexed contributions purchases an annual pension of 40.5% between 1,320 and 3,240 days and 19.6% after thirty years, between 4.3 and 8.9 times a self-financing benchmark of 4.6%. Raising the contributing share of private wage employees by one point a year postpones reserve exhaustion from 2036 to 2038 but deepens the 2070 technical deficit from 0.94% to 1.14% of GDP; across six assumed entrant profiles, newly declared workers fund at most 42% of the rights they accumulate by 2070. Under a self-financing linear accrual rule, the long-run effect becomes slightly positive. Lowering the density on which rights accrue from 293 to 222 days leaves finances almost unchanged but moves 7 to 15 points of a full-career cohort from the full-rate to the reduced pension. Formalization exposes, rather than creates, an accrual mispricing; it should be accompanied by prospective accrual reform and explicit, budgeted support for low earners.
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